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COMMON LAW OR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO SEALED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
CHERYL LYNNE COON
THE RIGHT TO seal settlement agreements is a vital
force in negotiations.' Parties may wish to avoid pub-
licity and scandal and.to protect their privacy.2 In prod-
ucts liability cases or mass torts, such as airplane crashes,
parties may want to prevent other potential plaintiffs from
using information from one particular case in other
cases.3 Parties feel this is justified because one claim may
be clearly well-grounded or clearly invalid, and it may or
may not be relevant to other potential plaintiffs' claims.
Perhaps the particular lawyer handling one plaintiff's case
was either very good or very poor at unearthing evidence
before the settlement.' Others may agree to sealing to
obtain an increased settlement. For whatever reason, the
I See infra notes 204-229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value of
encouraging settlement and confidentiality in some cases.
2 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197
(Minn. 1986) (discussing the families' rights to keep their grief and financial affairs
private by sealing plane crash settlement agreements). One article, Sealed Lawsuits
Shelter Wealthy, Influential, lists several other reasons for sealing records: "The se-
cret treatment of the lawsuits, according to plaintiffs lawyers, most frequently
stems from attempts to avoid personal embarrassment or professional disrepute,
to discourage additional lawsuits, or to coerce large settlements from defendants
in return for confidentiality." Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22, 1987, at IA, col. 5.
- See infra notes 84-98, 114-129, and accompanying text for example of cases
dealing with access of sealed settlements in products liability or mass tort cases.
4 See infra notes 114-129, 204-250, and accompanying text for a discussion of
some distinctions between settlements and court records, and the necessity of
confidentiality in settlements.
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right to seal settlement records is frequently crucial. 5 Yet,
the right to seal records is not absolute. In fact, the right
may be largely illusory and uncertain, and is often the
subject of abuse.6
Despite the value of sealing settlements, however, ac-
cess is often desirable in certain situations. For example,
in institutional reform litigation such as in civil rights or
employment situations where absent parties are poten-
tially affected by the outcome of a suit, sealing of consent
decrees or settlements is arguably improper and full ac-
cess should be accorded. 7 Addressing the recent notori-
ety of the access issue to everything from settlements to
sealed discovery documents, one article notes that '[flor
5 See, e.g., Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985) (without active
court participation and promise of confidentiality, settlement would never have
occurred). For a discussion of Palmieri, see infra notes 143-154.
See infra notes 49 and 191 and accompanying text for a discussion of potential
problems in right of access cases. An investigation in Dallas, Texas, for example,
revealed that courts had sealed eighty cases despite the fact there were no formal
court orders authorizing the sealings. See Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22, 1987, at
24A, col. 3. The paper interviewed a state district court judge, Judge John Mar-
shall, who stated that the abuse stemmed, in his opinion, from a '"good ol' boy
system" between judges and favored lawyers. Id. Further, as Judge Marshall
stated, parties waive their privacy concerns when they bring their disputes into the
judicial system. Id. "You are asking the government to come into your life. It's
not like the government is coming in here as an unwelcome visitor." Id. at 25A,
col. 4. As a means of controlling such abuse, Judge Marshall issued guidelines
and form orders for all the district court judges to use in the future when parties
request a sealing. Id. at 25A, col. 2. Several months later, Judge Marshall adopted
a "good cause" standard for parties to meet if they desire to close records, based
on the common law right of access. Dallas Morning News, Aug. 17, 1988, at 26A,
col. 3-6.
7 See Thornburg, Litigating the Zero Sum Game. The Effect ofInsitutional Reform Liti-
gation on Absent Parties, 66 OR. L. REV. 201 (1987) (discussing institutional reform
litigation and its affect on third parties). The article explains that "[i]nstitutional
reform cases aim to restructure certain units of society. In so doing, these cases
affect institutions and individuals that are not before the court. Courts, commen-
tators, and politicians have therefore expressed concern that the rights of the ab-
sent parties and insitutions not be ignored in the remedy-creation process." Id. at
251. Thus, one factor should be availability of full review to all potentially af-
fected. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. See, e.g., EEOC v. Stras-
burger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, 626 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980); Southern
Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (two related cases on discriminatory hiring practices
which settled on the stipulation that all materials remain confidential for a speci-
fied time period).
a number of years nobody thought much about secrecy or
about third parties who were not litigants .... Now we
see more concern for the public interest and a recognition
that some cases affect a lot of people and not just the par-
ties.' Another article cites not only abuses of sealing
and protective orders but the emerging device for com-
plete withdrawal of all the papers and documents of a case
from the record "leaving no trace that the lawsuit ever ex-
isted" and giving the parties the ultimate protection seal-
ing orders do not.9 Especially prevalent in products
liability cases or mass accidents, such practices prevent
"in the rush to secrecy ... the early warning signals about
defective products or questionable conduct [that] emerge
during open court proceedings.' 0 Thus, the practice
may prevent the public and state review boards from re-
ceiving notice of malpractice or unprofessional conduct
cases with the result that a psychologist or doctor sued,
perhaps repeatedly, continues in a thriving practice."
The Supreme Court has recently decided several cases
dealing with the public's right of access to criminal trials
Should A Court Keep Secrets, NAT'L L.J., Vol. 11 No. 6, 1, 22 (Oct. 7, 1988)
(discussing recent access cases and problems they create) (quoting Cornish F.
Hitchcock of the Public Citizen Litigation Group).
9 Secrecy Rules Hide Dangers, Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 23, 1988, at A-1, A-18.
The article lists the following practices as reasons for the abuse which results in
"secret" law: protective orders, negotiated settlements requiring secrecy in ex-
change for more money, sealing orders, and withdrawal orders. Id. at A-18, col.
2-3. Thus, each potential plaintiff not only has to repeat exact work done by past
plaintiffs throughout the case, but may never relate an injury to an event or have
adequate warning to prevent the harm from occurring. Arguably, this is not an
efficient allocation of society's resources.
lo Id. at A-18, col. 3. As the article suggests:
In local and federal courthouses across the country, there are confi-
dentiality orders in hundreds of cases that allege safety problems
with widely used products and facilities. Every day, someone gets
into a car, takes a drug, sees a doctor or wakes up near a toxic site
that has been the subject of a lawsuit covered by a confidentiality
order.
Id.
Id. at A-18, col. 3-4. Some judges may be reluctant to grant sealing orders
because of the significant public interests, one judge stating that "[w]hen parties
litigate, they're using a public process." Id. at col. 5 (quoting Judge Leonard
Braman of the Washington D.C. Superior Court).
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and criminal records. 2 The source of the public's right of
access to both the trial and records in civil cases, however,
is uncertain.' 3 Presently, two bases exist for potential ac-
cess to court records, including settlement agreements.
Some courts find a public right of access in the first
amendment, others under the common law right of ac-
cess. ' 4 Even among courts basing decisions solely on the
common law right of access, however, differences of opin-
ion exist as to the proper standard of review and the
proper test for granting a request to seal or unseal
materials.' 5
The focus of this comment is the public's right of access
to sealed civil settlement agreements which were dis-
cussed in open court or filed with the court, thus formally
12 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (access to
criminal pretrial proceeding); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501 (1984) (allowing access to voir dire in criminal proceeding); Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (access to criminal trial); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (public access to criminal
trial under the first amendment); see also infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Richmond Newspapers.
15 See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1985). In re Reporters discusses the differences between civil and criminal trials,
pretrial and trial material, and access to courts and records. Id. at 1330-1341; see
also Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 392 N.W.2d at 205-06 (discussing the many factors
and uncertainties which come into play in right of access cases as they relate to
access of settlement agreements). For a discussion of the differences between pre-
trial materials and trial records or evidence, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protec-
tive Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983); see infra notes 230-250.
14 Compare Palmieri, 779 F.2d 861 (case resting on common law right of access
and further separating original sealing from later unsealing) with Wilson v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (adopting a first amendment
standard to justify closure for products liability settlement sealing request). For a
discussion of these and other related cases see infra notes 83-203. Another issue
is the difference between pretrial, nonpublic and evidentiary materials, discussed
at infra notes 120-125, 230-250 and accompanying text. Settlement agreements
are similar to pretrial materials because they are ','private" contracts reached with
no court or public supervision in most cases. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20, 32-36 (1984); In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1331-37.
' See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339 (3d
Cir. 1986) (disagreement between the majority and dissent as to the proper stan-
dard); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App.), va-
cated, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1986) (appellate decision split on rehearing en banc,
subsequently vacated for lack of jurisdiction).
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becoming part of the court's records.' 6 Access cases raise
several issues under either a first amendment or common
law basis, each apparently with no "clear" answer, such as
the difference between access to court records versus ac-
cess to the trial itself' 7 and the difference between grant-
ing the original seal and later attempts by a third party to
unseal the agreement.' 8  Also, the issue of how much
weight courts should give to the value of encouraging set-
tlements in the various balancing tests used in determin-
ing a right of access arises.' 9 The comment addresses the
first amendment right of access, followed by a discussion
of the common law right and the value of encouraging
settlements. Finally, the comment discusses potential so-
lutions suggested by authorities for solving the access di-
lemma until a conclusive answer comes.
- See infra notes 186-193, 230-250, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the issue of whether filing an agreement with a court changes the nature of the
material because a court may rely on the material in forming its judgment. Some
commentators indicate that if a court does rely on material, the public's need for
access increases so that the public can fully understand the judicial determination.
See Marcus, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing a court's reliance on material as the
proper basis for determining a right of access to material).
17 See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ-
ences; see also In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1331 (distinguishing between access to
records and access to trials); Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial
Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659, 691-92 (1982) (noting the
Supreme Court's distinction between a right of access to trials and records).
18 See infra notes 142-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases
discussing this issue. Courts apply several factors in the various balancing tests
used for determining whether a right of access exists in a particular case. The
factors arose, however, in criminal access cases. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 555. Thus, an additional issue in right of access cases is whether these
factors apply equally to civil proceedings. For a discussion of this issue, see Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386-87 n.15 (1979) (discussing the applica-
tion of these factors to civil trials) and Fenner & Koley, Access toJudicial Proceedings:
To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1981) (in-
depth analysis of the factors presented in the Richmond Newspapers case and their
application to civil trials).
19 See, e.g., Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 933 (demonstrating the various views
vividly by contrasting the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions and dis-
cussing the value of encouraging settlement).
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I. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO CIVIL COURT RECORDS
The Supreme Court has not directly decided whether a
first amendment right to attend a civil proceeding exists. 20
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,2' however, the
Court held that the first amendment grants the public a
right to attend criminal proceedings.22 Thus, in order to
close a criminal case, a party must show "an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." 23
The Richmond Newspapers Court adopted a two-prong
historical/functional test, based on the historical open-
ness and importance of criminal proceedings and the
functional value of openness to a democratic govern-
ment.24  The Court listed several values advanced by
20 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (noting that the case did not
answer the question for civil trials since the issue was not raised); Fenner & Koley,
supra note 18, at 415 (discussing the extension of Richmond Newspapers to civil
proceedings).
2 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). In Richmond Newspapers, the press
sought to vacate an order closing a murder trial. Id. at 560. The trial court judge
held that, because the trial was the fourth trial for the defendant, caution was
necessary in order to prevent the jurors from hearing details outside the court-
room. Id. at 561.
22 Id. at 580. The Court stated that the "First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that Amend-
ment was adopted." Id. at 576. Moreover, the first amendment implicitly requires
access to assure the public's right to gather information. Id. at 575-76. The Court
explained that "[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concern-
ing what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the
trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily." Id. at 576-77. Justice Rehn-
quist, however, in the dissent, expressly rejected a public right of access under the
first or fourteenth amendments as long as the parties and the judge agree to clo-
sure. Id. at 604-06.
23 See Press-Entetprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510 (closing of criminal voir dire proceed-
ing); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-607. The Globe Newspaper Court held that in
a criminal case a party must show an important governmental interest and that no
less restrictive means exists to protect that interest to justify closure of either the
trial or records. 457 U.S. at 606-07.
24 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-78; see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Co-
hen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing the factors and using the two-prong
test in a decision extending the first amendment right of access to civil proceed-
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open trials. 25 These include: increasing the public's confi-
dence in the judicial system; enhancing the quality of the
system by subjecting proceedings to public view; increas-
ing public information about important social issues; and
educating the public about how the judicial system oper-
ates.2 6 If these historical and functional values of open-
ness outweigh the particular parties' benefits from
closure, sealing is improper.27
This first amendment balancing test, requiring a strong
showing to prevent access, is in fact very similar to the
common law right of access balancing test. Under the
common law test, each case is similarly decided on a bal-
ancing of the cases's particular facts and circumstances,
but with a lesser showing required to restrain access. 28 In
fact, courts use the same reasons, such as increasing pub-
lic confidence in the judiciary, as balancing factors under
both tests.29
After Richmond Newspapers, several courts extended the
first amendment right of access to civil proceedings using
the historical/functional test.3 0 From this extension,
some courts further held that a first amendment right of
access to civil court records exists, including settlement
agreements filed with a court under seal. 1
ings). For a discussion of Publicker Industries see infra notes 48-59 and accompany-
ing text.
25 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-78.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
29 See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602; Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 392 N.W.2d at 202-
03 (discussing balance and value of factors under common law test).
-o See Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11 th Cir. 1985). While
Wilson did not expressly adopt a first amendment basis, the court did adopt the
increased standard of proof necessary in first amendment cases to justify closure.
Thus, the court required demonstration of an important interest as a strict pre-
requisite to restricted access to information. Id. at 1570; see also Publicker Indus.,
733 F.2d at 1070-71; In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 723 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.
1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.
1983).
31 See infra notes 32-100 for some of the cases extending a right to civil records.
The courts, however, did not discuss the differences between the right of access to
trials and the right of access to records, which is a legitimate question potentially
1988] 583
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A. Extension of the Richmond Newspapers Test to Non-
Settlement Materials
One of the first cases to extend the first amendment
right of access to civil records was Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. FTC.3 2 In Brown & Williamson, the Public Cit-
izen Health Research Group, desiring to publish
information in Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports
regarding tar levels in Brown & Williamson's cigarettes,
intervened in a suit to modify an order sealing reports
Brown & Williamson submitted to the FTC.3 3  The citi-
zen's group asserted three bases for its right of access: the
Freedom of Information Act, 34 a common law right of ac-
cess, and the first amendment.3 5 The Brown & Williamson
court, using the Richmond Newspapers historical/functional
test, held that a first amendment right to the documents
affecting a determination of the access issue. See In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1331;
The Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Willis, 370 So. 2d 867, 871-72 (Fla. 1979)
(pointing out the differences between closing a trial and closing records and find-
ing no first amendment right allowing a court to unseal records which have been
properly sealed); Note, supra note 17, at 691 (noting the difference and that public
access is fulfilled solely by the right to attend a trial). In re Reporters stated that the
first amendment does not create a right of access to civil trials, "much less to
access to records in civil trials - or, for that matter, even records in criminal trials."
773 F.2d at 1331.
32 710 F.2d at 1165.
33 Id. at 1169. The group was a non-profit organization engaged in research
and publication of health and safety information. Id. The plaintiff, Brown & Wil-
liamson, was a cigarette manfuacturer whose tar levels were under investigation
by the FTC after the FTC received complaints alleging that the FTC's testing
methods produced erroneously low tar levels due to the special design of the
plaintiff's cigarettes. Id. at 1168. Thus, public health was potentially adversely
affected. Id. After determining the test results were incorrect, the FTC proposed
to publish the information, at which point Brown & Williamson sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to stop the press release. Id.
34 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). The Freedom of Information Act allows any person
to request from any federal governmental agency information ranging from
agency opinions and records to statements of policy and staff manuals in order to
prevent "secret" government. Id.
35 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1169. During the investigation, the FTC re-
quested comments from five major cigarette companies, including Brown & Wil-
liamson. Id. The FTC also agreed to seal all the information from the
administrative proceeding. Id. at 1176. The court dismissed the Freedom of In-
formation claim because the statute expressly exempts courts from its application.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(l)(B), 5526)(2) (1982).
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existed. 6 Thus, Brown & Williamson failed to satisfy the
increased burden of proof necessary to obtain closure. 7
Moreover, the court noted that in certain civil proceed-
ings, such as those with government agency involvement,
the public's interest and need for access are as high as in
criminal proceedings.38
Echoing the Richmond Newspapers Court, the Brown &
Williamson court discussed the fact that widely publicized
trials allow the public to see the government in action,
permit expression of public concerns on important issues
and venting of emotions, increase the quality of judicial
proceedings by public scrutiny, and increase the public's
confidence in the fairness of the judicial system? 9
Although the court noted that these factors arose in crimi-
nal access cases, it held that the factors apply with equal
force to civil trials.40 The court, however, did not discuss
the differences between criminal and civil proceedings. 4'
Ultimately, the Brown & Williamson court held that there
are only two categories of material exempt from public
access, which are: matters related to keeping order in the
courtroom and matters related to the content of the infor-
mation.42 Under the first category, the court held that a
36 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177-78.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1178. For example, the court listed antitrust, government regulation
actions, bankruptcy cases, and discrimination actions as instances in which public
interest is very high. Id. Public interest increases because the outcome of the trial
may affect citizens directly. Id.; see, e.g., In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1st
Cir. 1981) (allowing access to pretrial discovery material in a civil rights case on a
restricted basis).
Other suits where public interest is high include physician malpractice or sexual
misconduct, environmental contamination suits, and products liability cases. See
Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 4. A major concern is that profes-
sionals escape review by state regulatory boards by sealing records, which means
that physicians may have many instances of complaints against them yet no record
for the public to check. Id. at 25A, col. 6.
-- Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177-78.
40 Id.
41 Id.; see also Fenner & Koley, supra note 18, at 430-32 (discussing the factors
and their application to civil proceedings).
42 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179. Under the second category, trade
secrets, national security, and protecting the privacy of third parties justify clo-
sure. Id.; see also In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476-77 (6th Cir.
1988] 585
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party must demonstrate a compelling governmental inter-
est to override the traditional presumption of access.4"
Under the second category, the court employed a balanc-
ing test weighing the parties' interests in closure against
the public's interest in openness. 44 Additionally, the court
stated that a company's desire to keep commercially
harmful information from the public is not a factor for
consideration in the balancing test.45 In the court's opin-
ion, the result of giving weight to the private parties'
desires for secrecy would lead to abuses and a "norm" of
closure rather than openness.4 6
In 1984, the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal also extended the first amendment right of access to
civil court records.47 In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,48
the issue was whether the first amendment protected the
public's right of access to a confidential company report
entered as evidence during a trial.49 Only the portion of
1983) (allowing the sealing of FDIC records to preserve privacy because the mate-
rial contained financial information of both parties and nonparties); In re Estate of
Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1977) (closure, for a temporary
period only, to prevent serious threats to the lives and property of trust benefi-
ciaries). But see United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (permit-
ting access to defendant's tax returns which had been entered as evidence and
discussed in open court, thereby becoming part of the open court record and
waiving the right to privacy). The In re Estate of Hearst court clearly favored open-
ness and stressed the fact the closure was purely temporary. 136 Cal. Rptr. at
821. In re Estate of Hearst, therefore, was arguably an early indication of the trend
toward increased public access.
43 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
4 Id. The presumption in favor of disclosure tips the balance in favor of open-
ness under this category. Id. This balancing test, "weighing in" the presumption
of openness, is similar to the test used in determining the common law right of
access. The major difference between the two balancing tests is that the first
amendment test is weighted more heavily in favor of openness due to its constitu-
tional basis. See infra notes 99-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
common law test.
45 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
11; Id. For examples of present abuses of sealing, see Note, Publicker Industries v.
Cohen: Public Access to Civil Proceedings and a Corporation's Right to Privacy, 80 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1319, 1324 n.36, 1350-51 (1987).
47 See Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1061-70; Continental, 732 F.2d at 1302.
4H 733 F.2d at 1061.
41 Id. at 1064-65. The report concerned the company's use of an enzyme in the
production of its Scottish whiskey. Id. Disclosure of this practice threatened ad-
COMMENTS
the trial concerning the confidential report was closed to
the public. 50 The court, finding that the common law right
of access clearly applied, noted that a first amendment
right of access is not yet explicitly recognized in civil
cases.
5 1
The court, however, extended the first amendment
right of access to civil records and adopted the two-prong
historical/functional test from Richmond Newspapers.5 2 Pub-
licker Industries held that the balancing factors, although
originating in criminal access cases, logically apply with
equal force to civil cases. For example, the court stated
that openness would increase the quality of trials and edu-
cate .the public in civil as well as criminal trials. The court
also noted that, historically, civil trials were as open to the
public as criminal proceedings.53 Further, in the court's
opinion, openness in civil trials is just as necessary for the
democratic process as it is in criminal trials.54 Therefore,
Publicker Industries held that a party must show a compel-
ling governmental interest and the unavailability of a less
restrictive method to protect that interest to justify clo-
sure.55 Yet, while the court held that a first amendment
right of access exists, it failed to critically analyze the dis-
tinctions between civil and criminal trials, or between ac-
cess to a trial versus access to records.
verse economic consequences to the company, and the entire scotch industry as
well, due to the widespread practice of blending different scotch whiskeys. Id.
50 Id. The problem regarding the closure was that, by Publicker's own admis-
sion, at least one-third of the closed transcript did not contain truly confidential
information. Id. Further, the sealing was not by mutual agreement but solely at
the request of Publicker in order to protect its commercial reputation. Id.
-, Id. at 1066. Because the information was technically public at the time of the
trial, the court first had to determine whether the issue of access was moot. Id. at
1065. The court held that because the question was one which was likely to occur
again and which due to the short duration of trials could not normally be litigated
before a trial ended, the court had jurisdiction to determine the issue. Id. The
information was already "public" because the company released the material in
the report to its stockholders during the pending appeal. Id.
52 Id. at 1067; see also supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Richmond Newspapers and its test.
53 Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1070.
- Id. at 1067-71.
.s Id. at 1070-71.
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Publicker Industries, however, did note that the right of
access is not absolute under either the first amendment or
the common law.5 6  According to the court, the party
seeking closure bears the burden of proving a "clearly de-
fined and serious injury," such as that which occurs upon
disclosure of a trade secret to close a record. 57 The rea-
son for closing the Publicker Industries trial was proper be-
cause, if the public attended a confidentiality hearing, the
material would necessarily not be confidential.58 The
problem, however, was that the district court abused its
discretion by closing the entire record instead of narrowly
tailoring the closure to fit the needs of the case. 59
Similarly, in In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation,60
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended the first
amendment right of access not only to civil trials but also
to civil records.6' In Continental, the press sought to ob-
tain a special litigation committee report entered as evi-
dence in open court during a motion to terminate
shareholder derivative suits, 62 basing its claim on the
common law right of access.6 3 The company responded
- Id. at 1070.
57 Id. at 1070-71. Publicker Industries held that interests such as trade secrets,
attorney-client privilege, or a binding contractual duty not to disclose information
could justify closure. Id. at 1073. This raises the question of whether a binding
agreement as part of a settlement justifies closure, an idea which some courts have
rejected. See, e.g., Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1568 (allowing access to sealed settlement
which was sealed by mutual agreement of all parties); Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at
938 (holding that an agreement between the parties to deny access is not binding
on a court).
58 Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1063. Moreover, the court held that the injury
must be specific in order to qualify for consideration. Id. at 1071. Thus, the com-
pany's desire to keep information pertaining to its poor management practices
from the public did not qualify. Id. at 1074.
5 Id. at 1072-73. Another problem was that the district court failed to make an
adequate record for review. Id. at 1073. The Publicker Industries court also held
that a district court should make specific findings on the record concerning access
decisions in order to facilitate review. Id.
732 F.2d at 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. In Continental, shareholders were attempting to force the company to pur.
sue certain legal claims. Id. at 1304. The company, in response, hired lawyers t(
investigate the merits of the claims. Id. The law firm then hired an accounting
firm to investigate the company's auditors. Id.
62 Id. at 1304.
(;3 Id. at 1308.
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by asserting attorney-client privilege. 64 The court, how-
ever, began the opinion by stressing that a presumption
of openness attaches once material is entered in the court
records as evidence and relied on by the court in its
decision.6 5
While the Continental court did not expressly adopt a
first amendment basis for the right of access, the court did
adopt the more stringent first amendment standard re-
quiring a compelling interest or extraordinary circum-
stances to justify closure.66 Continental focused on the fact
that if ajudge relies on material, public access is necessary
for the public to fully understand the judicial opinion.6 7
The court also held that if parties discuss material in open
court, the information becomes part of the open court
record and subject to the presumption of openness.6 8
Like the Brown & Williamson and Publicker Industries courts,
however, the Continental court failed to discuss the distinc-
tions between access to records and access to trials or the
differences between civil and criminal proceedings.6 9
Further, Continental's argument that other parties
- Id. at 1304-05. The company also asserted that the material was protected by
work product immunity and that the protective order covering the report pre-
vented disclosure Id. at 1310. The court held, however, that once a party in-
troduces material as evidence in open court, he waives these defenses. Id. at
1314-15. The court indicated that the report was an important determinant of
whether it was proper to terminate the claims. Id. at 1307. In fact, the district
court judge expressly indicated his reliance on the material. Id.; see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 26.
65 Continental, 732 F.2d at 1308-09. The court listed factors such as improved
public confidence and better quality of court proceedings arising from openness
which weigh in favor of disclosure, along with court reliance. Id. Additionally, the
court held that due to the nature of the suit, involving the securities market, pub-
lic interest was high and thus weighed in favor of openness. Id. at 1308 n.9. Fol-
lowing the Brown & Williamson and Publicker Industries courts, the Continental court
used a balancing test weighing the parties' interests in closure against the public's
interests in openness. Id. at 1313.
- Id. at 1313. The balance must weigh clearly in favor of closure, thus a court
resolves any doubts in favor of disclosure. Id. Additionally, the court advocated
the use of specific findings on the record at the trial court level in order to avoid
the necessity of remanding cases when proper review is impossible. Id.
67 Id. at 1313.
66 Id. at 1313-14.
69 Id. at 1308-12; see also supra notes 32-59 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Brown & Williamson and Publicker Industries cases.
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would use the material against it in other lawsuits did not
persuade the Continental court to maintain closure. 70 The
Continental court expressly rejected the contention that,
absent a claim of clear and significant present danger to
the party, potential future harm can prevent disclosure.71
Moreover, the court stated that heightened scrutiny is
necessary in closure cases because less scrutiny could lead
to abuses and a decrease of public confidence in the judi-
ciary.72 The court did recognize, however, that allowing
access to the report would hamper the free flow of infor-
mation which makes special litigation committees
effective.
Thus, based on Continental and similar cases, there is an
apparent trend to extend the first amendment right of
access to both civil trials and civil records, based largely
on the historical/functional Richmond Newspapers' test. 4
When dealing with evidentiary materials, courts seem to
apply the Richmond Newspapers' factors equally to civil and
70 Continental, 732 F.2d at 1315.
71 Id. Further, the Continental court stated:
Continental also argues that confidentiality is required because
otherwise the report will be used against it in other litigation ....
We have some reason to doubt that the question whether third par-
ties may use the report in litigation against Continental is, in strict
contemplation, legally relevant to the decision whether the report
should be disclosed. Whether the material is damaging is a consid-
eration apart from attorney-client privilege or work product immu-
nity. And there is no general privilege, analogous to the fifth
amendment's protection against self-incrimination, that protects
against disclosure of information that may lead to civil liability.
Id.
72 Id. at 1314. The court stated that "[wihile sealing one document in one case
may not have a measurable effect on confidence . . . the effect of a consistent
practice of sealing documents could prove damaging." Id.
73 Id. at 1314-15. The court, however, clearly refused to adopt a per se rule in
favor of disclosure. Id. Rather, the court held that each case would turn on the
balancing of its unique factors. Id. The dissent, however, noted that the report
was submitted as evidence under seal and therefore was never really part of the
open court record. Id. at 1320 (Pell, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent believed
that the effects of the decision on special litigation committees deserved more
weight than the majority attributed to the issue. Id. at 1316.
74 See supra notes 32-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of some cases
which extended the right.
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criminal cases. 75 In civil or criminal cases, a court's reli-
ance on material in forming a judgment on the merits ne-
cessitates access so that the public may fully comprehend
the judicial determination.7 6 A major problem with the
trend, however, is the fact that the cases do not provide an
in-depth analysis of the distinctions between civil and
criminal trials.7 7 Further, some cases fail to discuss the
differences between access to records and access to trials
or between pretrial and evidentiary materials.78
For example, the Brown & Williamson case demonstrates
the difference between access to non-settlement eviden-
tiary material and access to settlement agreements. 79 The
case centered on an administrative agency and its ac-
tions 80 and dealt with significant public health issues. 81
Thus, public interest in disclosure weighed heavily in the
balance. By contrast, most settlement agreements nor-
mally concern only private individuals, do not relate to
public issues, are not evidentiary, and occur in private
with no rules regulating behavior or directing results.2
7- See supra notes 21-27, 65-68 and infra notes 230-242 and accompanying text
for a discussion of factors which courts consider and the effect of court reliance on
access.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Publickerlndus., 733 F.2d at 1059; Continental, 732 F.2d at 1032; Brown
& Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1165.
78 See Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1059.
79 See infra notes 114-129, 230-242, and accompanying text for a discussion of
some of the differences.
80 Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180. One difference is that Brown & Wil-
liamson's competitors had ready access to the information due to the previous
administrative proceeding. Id. Thus, any threat of harm to Brown & Williamson
rested solely on release to the general public. Id.
8 Id. at 1168. Because the FTC determined that the tar levels were erroneously
low for Brown & Williamson's cigarettes, public safety and health were expressly
implicated. Id. Additionally, the court held that the FTC's promise of confidenti-
ality did not bind a federal court in subsequent litigation. Id. at 1180; see also 5
U.S.C. § 57b-2(d)(2) (1987) (stating that disclosure of material from confidential
agency documents is governed by court rules or orders).
82 See infra notes 230-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ-
ences between settlement agreements and evidentiary materials. Perhaps the
largest difference concerns court reliance on evidentiary material to form a judg-
ment, thus increasing the need for public access so that the public may fully un-
derstand judicial decisions, an issue discussed at supra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text.
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B. Extension of First Amendment Right of Access to Settlement
Agreements
Thus far the cases adopting a first amendment standard
for a right of access to civil trials and records have not
dealt with settlement agreements, which are arguably sim-
ilar to nonpublic pretrial materials. 83 The cases did, how-
ever, establish a foundation which later courts used to
permit access to settlements. In Wilson v. American Motors
Corp.,84 for example, the plaintiff sought to invoke non-
mutual collateral estoppe 85 against American Motors
and, therefore, wanted to unseal a previous settlement
agreement between Wilson and American Motors. 86 After
discussing the common law right of access, Wilson noted
that the Supreme Court has not extended the first amend-
ment right of access to civil trials or records. The Wilson
court also noted the varying standards and uncertainty
among appellate courts regarding access to civil
records.88 Ultimately, after analyzing the cases, Wilson
held that in view of the strong presumption of openness
of courts and records, a party must show a "compelling
governmental interest" in order to close either a trial or
83 See supra notes 32-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
84 759 F.2d 1568 (1lth Cir. 1985).
85 Nonmutual collateral estoppel compares to res judicata in that a litigant may
rely on a previous determination of an issue if a party had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue in a previous suit. See LANDERS & MARTIN, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 933-53 (1981).
86 759 F.2d at 1569. Both plaintiffs were injured by the same modeljeep manu-
factured by American Motors. Id. The plaintiff asserted both a common law and a
first amendment basis for the right of access. Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1570. The court referred to the Publicker Industries and Brown & William-
son cases which extended the first amendment right to access to civil evidentiary
materials. Id. The Wilson court further noted that the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that there is no constitutional right of physical access to courtroom
exhibits. Id. The Fifth Circuit ruling bound the Wilson court since the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981.
Id. (referring to Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Therefore, the Wilson court separated the materials sought by the plaintiff into two
groups: those related to the court records, such as pleadings, docket entries, and
transcripts; and courtroom exhibits. Id.
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records.8 9 It thereby adopted the more stringent first
amendment standard.90 Thus, because the original party
did not demonstrate "exceptional circumstances," the
court held that the order granting the original seal was
invalid.9 Additionally, Wilson held that a company cannot
prevent disclosure merely by asserting that release will
harm its commercial reputation. 2
Moreover, Wilson held that the need to encourage set-
tlements cannot justify closure although recognizing that
it is a valid concern.93 While recognizing the existence of
public and private interests in encouraging settlements,
the court stated that "the payment of money to an injured
party is simply not 'a compelling governmental interest'
.... - The court's major concern was that if courts give
weight to parties' desires for "secrecy" many parties
would agree to close records, thus leading to abuses of
the system. 95 Wilson raises questions, however, of fairness
89 Id. at 1571.
Id. Adopting the standard from criminal access cases, the Wilson court also
held that closure must be narrowly tailored to suit the particular situation. Id.
(referring to Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07). Wilson differs from some cases
in that although the court sealed the entire record, the trial itself was open to the
public. Id. at 1569. Thus, the plaintiff or anyone could have attended the trial.
Id. Further, the Wilson parties settled only after the jury answered special inter-
rogatories, as opposed to other cases which settle before the trial or at least
before the case reaches the jury. Id.
91 Id. The court, however, failed to distinguish and discuss the differences be-
tween access to a trial and access to records, simply noting that the public could
have attended the trial. Id. For a discussion of these distinctions, see infra notes
108-110 and accompanying text. Wilson listed as examples of "exceptional cir-
cumstances" protection of trade secrets, national security, and privacy of third
parties. 759 F.2d at 1570. The court even indicated that if material is relevant to
another case, access is desirable in order to save costs and time for both the court
and the parties. Id. at 1571 n.3.
92 id. at 1571-72. Further, the court stated that a "desire to prevent the use of
[the] trial record in other proceedings is simply not an adequate justification for
its sealing." Id.
9. Id. In fact, the Wilson court noted that the district court judge actively partici-
pated in the settlement, and stated that "[t]here is no question that courts should
encourage settlements." Id. at 1571-72 n.4.
94 Id.
1,s Id. The court stated that:
[T]he payment of money to an injured party is simply not 'a compel-
ling governmental interest' legally recognizable or even entitled to
consideration in deciding whether or not to seal a record. We feel
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to the parties because settlements depend largely on the
skills and efforts of counsel and the varying desires of the
parties rather than upon established objective stan-
dards. 96 Thus problems arise from the Wilson court's fail-
ure not only to distinguish civil and criminal cases, but to
separate settlement agreements from evidentiary court
materials.9 7 Yet, the Wilson decision follows the trend to-
ward increased public access based on the first amend-
ment and extends the right to include settlement
agreements filed or discussed in a court during products
liability cases.98
II. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS
The common law right of access test is essentially the
same balancing test as the first amendment test except the
balance is not tipped as greatly in favor of access. In fact,
courts cite many of the same reasons for access in com-
mon law cases. For example, both civil and criminal trials
have traditionally been open to the public with a corre-
sponding presumption of openness attaching to the court
records .99
certain that many parties to lawsuits would be willing to bargain
(with the adverse party and the court) for the sealing of records after
listening to or observing damaging testimony and evidence. Such
suppression of public records cannot be authorized. The situation
here is further aggravated by the attempted suppression of a jury
verdict because it might adversely affect American Motors in other
judicial proceedings. Such action is contrary to the most basic prin-
ciples of American jurisprudence.
Id.
Id. at 1568. The danger lies in the fact that the factors relied on as support-
ing access arose in criminal actions. Moreover, a settlement is a private contract in
contrast to evidence because evidence forms the basis of a court's judgment and is
"public" information. See supra notes 20-31 for a discussion of Richmond Newspa-
pers and infra notes 230-242 for a discussion of court reliance and its relationship
to public access.
1,7 Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1568-72.
' See supra notes 32-82 for a discussion of this trend and cases following it.
19 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); United States v. Edward, 672 F.2d
1289, 1290 (7th Cir. 1981); Note, supra note 17; Fenner & Koley, supra note 18;
Note, supra note 46. The Craig court emphasized that a "trial is a public event",
thus making what transpires in the courtroom public property. 331 U.S. at 368.
Another court stated that "[o]nce the evidence has become known to the mem-
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In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,t00 concerning the
press's efforts to gain access to the actual Watergate
tapes, the Supreme Court clearly acknowledged a com-
mon law right of access to court records." 1 The Court
stated that "the courts of this country recognize a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents."'11 2  Further,
the Court held that a party does not need a proprietary or
evidentiary interest in the material in order to enjoy this
right.t°3
Nixon also stated, however, that the common law right
of access is not absolute and that courts retain supervisory
powers over their records. 0 4 Thus, a court may deny ac-
cess in order to prevent use of the material for "improper
purposes" such as sensationalism or promoting public
scandal.' 05 Additionally, a court may deny access if the
party seeking the information may use the material to
bers of the public . . . it would take the most extraordianary circumstances to
justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically in attendance at the
courtroom to see and hear the evidence .... " In re National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) (criminal case concerning access
to tapes played as evidence during open court). The National Broadcasting court
noted, however, that if the evidence had been offered under a properly granted
seal the case would have been entirely different because that portion of the trial
would not have been open to the public. Id. at 952 n.4.
too 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The tapes were played as evidence in open court. Id.
The public and the press, however, already had transcripts of the tapes. Id. Thus,
as the Court noted, only physical access to the tapes themselves remained unavail-
able. Id. at 590.
to, Id. at 597. The Court held that the common law right exists although its
exact historical origins are unclear and there are no cases directly on point de-
lineating the exact scope of the right. Id.
102 Id. (footnote omitted).
103 Id. For instance, Nixon stated that a citizen's desire to inspect the records
merely to check on and observe the workings of the government justifies access.
Id. at 598.
104 Id. at 598.
o.% Id. The Nixon Court indicated that the proper test balances the factors favor-
ing access, adding the presumption of openness, against the factors weighing
against disclosure. Id. at 602. This test is very similar to the first amendment test
yet without the increased burden of proof necessary to overcome the presumption
of openness. See also supra notes 20-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the first amendment standard and cases using it.
596 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
harm the commercial standing of a competitor. 0 6 Ulti-
mately, the Nixon Court indicated that decisions regarding
disclosure rest in the trial court's discretion and depend
on the weight of the particular facts of each case. 10 7
Significantly, the Nixon decision further stated that
neither the first nor the sixth amendments support a right
of access to court records.' 08 The Court, noting the differ-
ences between access to a trial and access to records,
stated that "[t]he requirement of a public trial is satisfied
by the opportunity of members of the public and the press
to attend the trial and to report what they have ob-
served."' 0 9 Thus, the Nixon Court expressly rejected the
0o Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
107 Id. at 599. The Court suggested factors which trial courts should weigh in
the balance, including: the value of allowing the public to view the judicial pro-
cess; the value of informing the public about important events; the importance of
the event in question; the parties' right to privacy; the need to protect privacy of
third parties; and the use for which the material is sought. id. at 600-02. The
Court, however, decided the issue based on the Presidential Recordings Act, mak-
ing the discussion of the common law right of access dictum. Id. at 603-07; see also
Presidential Recordings Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 101, 2107-2108, 2201-2207
(1982). Indeed, the fact the decision does not rest on the common law right of
access causes uncertainties among courts and commentators regarding the proper
standard of review and the strength of the presumption of openness. Uncertainty
about the standard of review arises from the Court's statement, after discussing
the balancing factors, that "[alt this point, we normally would be faced with the
task of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest
and the duty of the courts." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602. One view holds that a review-
ing court should grant the lower court's decision a high degree of finality, using
the normal abuse of discretion test. The other view states that a reviewing court
should reweigh the factors, granting the lower court's decision only a slight de-
gree of finality because of the Nixon Court's statement. See Note, supra note 17, at
683-85 (advocating the use of the slight degree of finality standard).
-8 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608-10 (emphasis added). Some authorities argue that
there is also an implicit right of access under the first amendment because the
public cannot physically attend every trial. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 691.
The note states:
It is possible, however, that the right to attend criminal trials, as a
practical matter, does not satisfy the public's right to freedom of in-
formation .... In order to guarantee the implicit constitutional right
of [the] public and press to attend criminal trials to obtain informa-
tion, the Supreme Court could recognize another implicit, indispen-
sable right to inspect and copy evidentiary tapes ....
Id. The note, however, concludes that this implicit right does not exist and fur-
ther, that the right of access is satisfied by the right to attend trials. Id. at 692.
''s Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610. Some courts have noted the Nixon Court's failure to
establish a first amendment right of access to civil records, as well as the uncer-
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argument that the first amendment supports access to
criminal court records, much less to civil records or settle-
ment agreements."t0
A. Application of the Common Law Right of Access to
Settlement Agreements
Nixon firmly implanted the common law right of access
to criminal judicial records in most cases."'I Yet, Nixon
tainties concerning access. See Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 434 (criminal case
dealing with access to audiotoapes played as evidence). The Belo Broadcasting
court, referring to access cases, stated:
In erecting such stout barriers against those opposing access and in
limiting the exercise of the trial court's discretion, our fellow circuits
have created standards more appropriate for protection of constitu-
tional than of common law rights. With all due respect, we find such
standards to be misreadings of the Supreme Court's directives, and
we decline to apply them here.
Id.
lo Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608-10. The Court stated:
Respondents claim that [the first amendment] guarantees the press
,access' to - meaning the right to copy and publish - exhibits and
materials displayed in open court.
This argument misconceives the holding in Cox Broadcasting. Our
decision in that case merely affirmed the right of the press to publish
accurately information contained in court records open to the public
.... The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to
information about a trial superior to that of the general public.
Id. at 608-09 (emphasis added) (referring to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) (dealing with the first amendment right of access to names of
criminal victims)). Further, the Court stated:
Respondents contend that release of the tapes is required by the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial. They acknowledge
that the trial at which these tapes were played was one of the most
publicized in history, but argue that public understanding of it re-
mains incomplete in the absence of the ability to listen to the tapes
The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of
members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report
what they have observed.
Id. at 610; see also Hagenbach, Sealed Judicial Records and Infant Doe: A Proposal to
Protect the Public's Right of Access, 16 IND. L. REv. 861, 882 (1983) (noting the uncer-
tainty of a first amendment basis for a right of access to records and advocating
adoption of clear guidelines to allow lower courts to more effectively use the com-
mon law right of access); Note, supra note 17, at 691 (distinguishing the right of
access to trials from access to records and discussing the Nixon Court's apparent
refusal to find a first amendment basis for a right of access to records).
- See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nixon.
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left unanswered several questions, such as the proper
standard of review, the strength of the presumption in
favor of openness, and how far the decision extends to
civil trials or records."t 2 Lower courts, however, have at-
tempted to delineate the scope of the right and create
.standards for applying the balancing test to actual situa-
tions. 1 3  For example, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v.
Schumacher,"14 the issue was whether the court should un-
seal five settlement agreements arising from an airplane
crash. 1 5 The appellate court granted access to the docu-
ments, focusing on the fact the parties discussed the terms
of the settlements in open court." 6 Further, the appellate
21 See infra notes 243-250 and supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text for
discussion of these questions and possible answers. The uncertainties arise
mainly from the fact that the case ultimately rested on grounds other than the
common law right of access, as well as the Court's statements about the standard
of review and presumption of openness. Regarding the presumption of openness,
the Court stated that "[a]lso on respondents' side is the presumption - however
gauged - in favor of public access to judicial records." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602
(emphasis added).
I' See infra notes 111-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
courts' attempts.
114 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
.1 Id. at 200. Galaxy Airlines, Inc. operated the plane which crashed. Id. An
additional factor in the case was that state.law required the parties to file the agree-
ments with the court because minor heirs were involved. Id. at 200 n. 1 (referring
to MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1984)). Therefore, the case is different from the major-
ity of settlements in which filing with the court is voluntary. Id. For another prod-
ucts liability case allowing access to settlement agreements, but under a first
amendment right, see supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
16 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 383 N.W.2d 323, 327
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The appellate court stated that once material becomes
part of an open court record only "compelling governmental interests" can justify
closure. Id. at 328. Thus, the appellate court adopted the heightened scrutiny
standard normally used in first amendment cases. Id. The dissent, however, dis-
agreed, stating that the first amendment standard applies only to criminal cases.
Id. at 328 (Wozniak, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent stated that the majority's
prior restraint analysis was not proper because the public never had the informa-
tion and no one was prohibiting dissemination of public material. Id. at 329.
Even though the hearings were open to the public, no one but the parties at-
tended. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 200. Moreover, the dissent
noted that the only information that the press did not have was the amount and
terms of the settlements. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 383 N.W.2d at 329-30.
The dissent believed that publication of this information would not serve any of
the traditional factors used to justify access, such as increasing the quality of the
judicial proceedings by public scrutiny. Id. at 330.
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court held that encouraging settlements, even in a mass
tort situation, was not a "weighty" enough factor to over-
come the presumption of openness because this factor is
present in all litigation.' 1 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, noted that
while some courts have extended the first amendment
right of access to include civil trials and records, most
have not."' Thus, the court chose to adopt a standard
requiring a party to demonstrate "strong countervailing
reasons" or "compelling reasons" for closure.' 19 Turning
to the balancing test under the "compelling reasons"
standard, the court stated that the majority of settlement
agreements take place in private with the court exercising
no control over the events. 2 0  Further, as the court ob-
served, courts are not involved at all in typical settlements
because the parties normally move for voluntary dismissal
117 Id. at 328. The dissent, however, pointed out that the majority did not ana-
lyze the distinctions between criminal and civil trials before adopting the first
amendment standard, which arose from criminal cases. Id. In the dissent's opin-
ion, settlement agreements are not public parts of any trial. Id. at 330. Addition-
ally, the dissent noted that settlements take place in private without the
participation of the court and emphasized the fact that filing in the present case
was not voluntary. Id.
11 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 203. The court also noted the
absence of a decision by the Supreme Court on the issue and that most courts
elect to base access on the common law right. Id.
,,9 Id. at 202. One of the problems in right of access cases is the varying stan-
dards among courts using the common law right of access, in addition to the con-
fusion as to whether a first amendment claim also exists. The court expressly
limited its decision, however, to apply only to settlement documents "or tran-
scripts made part of a civil court file by statute," thus implicitly recognizing that
different materials may need different tests and standards. Id. at 203.
120 Id. at 204. The court stated:
Historically, the majority of settlements entered into between parties
have been private. The parties agree to settle in private, outside of
the courtroom and without the participation of the court. The court
is only involved by accepting a stipulated agreement in which the
parties inform the court that there has been a settlement and ask that
the case be dismissed. The court, however, does not approve, or
even inquire into, the terms of the settlement. The historic privacy
of settlement agreements is borne out by the fact that settlements,
offers to settle, and statements made during settlement negotiations
are all inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence to prove liability.
Id. (referring to MINN. R. EvID. 408).
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after reaching an agreement.' 2' Moreover, the court
noted that the present filing was not voluntary. 22 Finally,
the value of encouraging settlements, especially in cases
with several potential suits like this one, was a significant
factor which the court weighed in the balance. 23 The
court stated that release of the information would not
only impede further settlements between Galaxy and po-
tential plaintiffs, but could also "chill" future settlements
in other unrelated cases. 124 This "chilling effect" on set-
tlements would then increase the time and costs of litiga-
tion, both to the parties and the courts. 25
121 Id. Certain exceptions to this rule, such as class action suits, require courts
to approve the settlement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 23.1 (class actions and share-
holder derivative suits).
122 See supra note 115 and text for a discussion of the state's filing requirement.
123 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 205. Another factor noted by
the court is the fact that parties cannot use settlement terms as evidence in trials.
Id. at 204. In the court's opinion, this restriction demonstrates the private nature
of settlements. Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 408. Further, Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. noted that a major reason parties settle is to avoid publicity. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 204-06. The court also held, however, that parties
cannot escape access simply by agreeing among themselves to seal the settlement.
Id. Rather, the decision rests with the court and depends on the particular bal-
ance of all the factors of each case. Id.
, 2 Id. at 205. The court indicated that by adopting a standard permitting easy
access to sealed settlements, future litigants would hesitate to settle if confidenti-
ality was a key element because confidentiality could not be guaranteed. Id. The
court stated:
The philosophical reasoning behind allowing private settlements
also leads to the conclusion that such agreements should remain pri-
vate. This court has often stated that it favors the settlement of dis-
puted claims without litigation . . . . To allow public access to
settlement documents filed with a court may circumvent this policy.
One of the reasons parties agree to settle is that they do not wish to
go to trial and expose their disputes to the public . . . . It would
therefore be inconsistent with our public policy encouraging settle-
ment to allow the settlement documents in this case to be made pub-
lic. Such reasoning would tend to discourage settlements rather
than encourage them.
Id. The court feared that allowing access would hamper negotiations between
Galaxy and plaintiffs whose suits were still pending. Id.
125 Id. at 201, 205. Other factors the court weighed included the privacy of the
families, their right to grieve in private, and their right to have their financial af-
fairs private. Id. at 206. Additionally, disclosure of the settlement amount could
increase the likelihood of theft and vandalism. Id. As the dissent in the appellate
decision stated:
[T]he privacy interests of the grieving families in these cases is com-
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Thus, contrasting the Minneapolis Star & Tribune appel-
late and supreme court opinions reveals the conflict and
uncertainty over right of access cases and the proper basis
for access.' 26 Even though the court rejected a first
amendment basis, it nonetheless confused the outcome by
adopting a compelling need standard to justify closure.
The value of the case, however, lies in its recognition and
discussion of the importance of encouraging settle-
ments. 127 For example, the supreme court recognized the
increased value of encouraging settlement in situations
like plane crashes where there are multiple plaintiffs. 28
Finally, the court recognized the distinction between set-
tlement agreements and other court materials - a factor
which courts should analyze but often neglect. 29
Yet another problem arises when, due to the identity of
the parties or the nature of the lawsuit, significant public
interest in disclosure exists.130 For example, in Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Collazo,' 3 1 the Miami Herald sought ac-
pelling. They have a right to be left alone. They have a right not to
have their tragedy thrust into the public eye without their consent
and with no redeeming public purpose except the satisfaction of the
public's idle curiosity. They have a right not to have their personal
financial affairs splashed across the pages of a newspaper. They
have a right to be free from burglary, harassment, and intimidation,
instances of which have already been documented in these cases.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 383 N.W.2d at 330 (Wozniak, J., dissenting).
12 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 197; Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 383 N.W.2d at 323.
127 See infra notes 204-250 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value
of encouraging settlements.
128 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 205.
29 See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
tinctions between settlements and other trial materials, and supra notes 32-98 and
accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which these distinctions were not
recognized.
130 See, e.g., In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d at 108 (allowing access to pretrial
discovery materials in a civil rights case because of the high public interest); see also
supra notes 38 and 65 and accompanying text for types of cases with great public
interest. Another example of a topic of great public interest is Aids, a deadly viral
infection recently sparking public controversy. One judge refused to seal court
records in a suit involving a pediatrician alleged to have the Aids virus, in spite of
the fact that the publicity could, and did, ruin the physician's practice. See Dallas
Morning News, Nov. 22, 1987, at 24A, col. 1.
1", 329 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1976).
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cess to a sealed settlement between the city of Miami and
Collazo, who was the victim of a police shooting.1 2 The
trial, however, was open to the public except for the por-
tion in which the parties discussed the settlement
terms.' 33 The trial court denied access to the sealed set-
tlement, stating that "the amount of money involved was
no one's business but those of the parties involved them-
selves.' 1 3 4 The Miami Herald appealed, asserting a first
amendment right of access to the settlement. 13 5
The appellate court, however, focused on the common
law right of access rather than the first amendment. 3 6
One significant factor to the court was the involvement of
a governmental unit as a party.1' The court stated that
the public had a substantial interest weighing in favor of
disclosure because the suit involved city funds obtained
from public taxes, which were used for the city's insur-
ance, salaries and the cash settlement. 38  Balancing the
132 Id. at 334. The police shot and paralyzed Collazo during a burglary investi-
gation. Id. Collazo's suit alleged that police misconduct and improper police
training were the causes of the injury. Id.
!- Id. The trial lasted only two days before the parties settled. Id.
134 Id. at 335.
13- Id. Collazo and the city defended by asserting a right to privacy and the
right to reach a private agreement. Id.
136 Id. at 336-38. The court stated that it was "unaware of any specific constitu-
tional or statutory provision giving the press or the public a right to attend a
judicial proceeding." Id. at 337. Further, the court enunciated that an open court
is "an indispensable part of our system of government and our way of life" and
that "what transpires in the courtroom is public property." Id.
17 Id. at 338. The court stated that the value of open courts in a representative
form of government is great and, therefore, with the city's involvement as a party
the presumption in favor of openness increased. Id. at 336. Also, after reviewing
criminal and civil cases, the court stated that the two justifications for closure are
significant privacy concerns and the need to guarantee an impartial and fair trial.
Id. Privacy concerns cited by the court included certain juvenile proceedings,
adoption, and bastardy actions. Id.
"' Id. at 338. The court stated:
Further, appellants' right to know the terms of the settlement agree-
ment is particularly compelling here because of the nature of the
issues being litigated, i.e., alleged police misconduct and improper
police training involving a City of Miami police officer acting in his
official capacity. These issues created a substantial monetary liability
for the City and influenced its insurance rates for the future, which
costs must be borne by the taxpapers. Moreover, the activities com-
plained about are by their very nature newsworthy.
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factors of the case, the court therefore held that the trial
court abused its discretion by granting the request to seal
the settlement. 139
Collazo provides a good example of how the common
law balancing process can work to provide an acceptable
answer if courts consider all the factors, including the na-
ture of the suit and the identity of the parties. 4 ' Thus,
the proper balancing of the factors should act to eliminate
potential abuses of closure requests while adequately pro-
tecting both public and private interests because the bal-
ancing process takes in all relevant factors, ranging from
privacy interests to potential decreases in court costs and
time if settlements are encouraged by guaranteeing confi-
dentiality.' 4 ' Because the court balances the factors, and
not the parties, the potential for abuse is limited.
B. Distinguishing Between Sealing and Unsealing
While the balancing tests under the common law right
of access works, albeit with some confusion, other factors
besides the identity of the parties or nature of the suit
come into play. Another factor which some courts recog-
nize in right of access cases is that courts may need to ap-
ply a different standard when determining the
appropriateness of later attempts by unrelated third par-
ties to unseal settlements. This difference is important
because the original parties may have relied on confiden-
tiality in reaching the settlement agreement. 42 In Palmieri
Id. The insurance company had already indicated that premiums would increase
due to the city's claim experience. Id. at 336.
139 Id. at 338-39. Further, the court declared that the city's fears that the infor-
mation would affect pending litigation against the city was not a factor to weigh in
the balance. Id. at 337. This reason did not rise to the level of being a "cogent
reason for sealing" and the city failed to show "any immediate threat to the ad-
ministration of justice" to justify the closure. Id.
140 See supra notes 123, 130-139, for cases in which the balance arguably works
well regardless of the circumstances.
141 See supra notes 46, 50, 95 and infra note 177 and accompanying text for ex-
amples of abuses.
142 See infra notes 142-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issues
of parties' reliance and fairness.
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v. New York,' 43 for example, the court drew a distinction
between the original sealing of the settlement and the
later attempt to unseal it.' 44 In Palmieri, the state of New
York intervened in a private antitrust action between Pal-
mieri and DIC Concrete Corp. to modify the order sealing
the settlement so that the district attorney could use the
information in grand jury proceedings against the par-
ties.' 45 After the district court granted the motion to un-
seal, Palmieri appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 46
Recognizing the differences between sealing and un-
sealing, the Second Circuit adopted a standard requiring
a party seeking disclosure to show "extraordinary circum-
stances or compelling need," the opposite of the test for
sealing. 47 Thus, Palmieri held that when parties rely on a
settlement's confidentiality, the party seeking access must
satisfy the greater burden of proof.14  Indeed, the court
stated that a party's reliance "raises a presumption in
favor Qf upholding [the sealing] orders."' 149
In Palmieri, the court was faced with two competing in-
143 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
I44 d. at 863. The parties and the court acknowledged the great overlap be-
tween the state's antitrust action and the parties' case. Id. In fact, this is one
reason the state sought to unseal the settlement agreement. Id. at 864-65.
45 Id. at 864.
146 Id. at 862. The parties' main argument was that they were deprived of legal
rights because they had relied heavily on the sealing order in reaching the settle-
ment. Id.
147 Id. at 866. This standard is the exact opposite of the usual standard which
requires the party seeking closure to demonstrate compelling need. See supra notes
99-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the usual standard.
148 Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865. One factor the court noted was the magistrate's
very active role in achieving the settlement due to the parties concern that the
Attorney General would obtain the information. Id. Thus, it would be unfair for
the court to first encourage and actively assist in settlement only to then allow
access to the material which the court promised would remain sealed. Id. The
magistrate even stated that the settlement would have been extremely hard, if not
impossible, without the promise to seal the agreement. Id. at 864. Earlier, the
Attorney General used information from a sealed agreement against DIC Con-
crete Corp., which led to the parties' fears in Palmieri. Id. at 863.
19 Id. Additionally, the court stated:
As appellants have argued, here the very papers and information
that the Attorney General seeks apparently would not even have ex-
isted but for the sealing orders and the magistrate's personal assur-
terests: (1) the state's interest in criminal investigation
and obtaining evidence for grand jury proceedings; and
(2) the interest in promoting settlement. 5 0  The court
first noted that, in a previous decision, it held parties are
entitled to rely on protective orders to prevent third party
access even if the third party is a governmental unit.' 5'
Also, the court stated that a state begins the battle against
any private litigant with a distinct advantage due to its ex-
tensive investigative power. 52 Thus, while a party's reli-
ance would not automatically foreclose unsealing, the
court held the decision whether to unseal a settlement
agreement is best left to the trial court's discretion. 53
The court further stated that the trial court should decide
based on the unique facts of each case with a view toward
maintaining closure in cases where the parties relied on
confidentiality. 151
Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones'55 also demonstrates the
uncertainty and conflicting views regarding the right of
access to judicial records and settlement agreements and
the value of encouraging settlements, although the case
was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction. 56 The Times
Herald attempted to unseal a settlement agreement, court
orders, and non-discovery materials to publish the mate-
ances of confidentiality, upon which the appellants apparently relied
in agreeing to enter closed-door settlement negotiations.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. (referring to Martindell v. International Tel & Tel Corp., 594 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1979)). Thus, by analogy a party should be entitled to rely on an order
sealing settlement documents as neither order deals with evidentiary materials.
In Alartindell, the court held that a party must show compelling need or extraordi-
nary circumstances to overcome a protective order regardless of whether the
party seeking access was a governmental unit. 594 F.2d at 296.
,.5 Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866.
1- Id. at 865.
1-" Id. (emphasis added). The court remanded the case to the district court af-
ter developing the new standard for unsealing. Id. The court also held that if the
state could demonstrate a compelling need, such as the impossibility of obtaining
the information by any other means after a good faith effort, disclosure would be
proper. Id. at 865-66.
717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App), vacated, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1986).
Id. at 933-48.
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rial arguing that the public needed the facts to evaluate a
judge seeking re-election. 57 The trial court had sealed
the record upon the requests of both parties after the par-
ties settled before the actual trial began. 58 The Times
Herald argued it had a right of access under the common
law, first amendment, and the Texas Constitution. 5 9
After disposing of the other two claims, the Times Herald
court accepted the existence of the common law right of
access based on Nixon. 160 The court reiterated, however,
that the right is not absolute' 6' and stressed the discretion
of the trial court in the balancing test.162 Thus, the court
held that closure is proper if the information sought con-
tains a trade secret; pertains to national security; involves
the privacy of third parties; or if there is a binding con-
tractual duty not to disclose the information. 63 Signifi-
cantly, the court analyzed the difference between
unsealing, which raises questions of the parties' reliance
on confidentiality, and sealing. 64 Thus, like the Palmieri
court, the Times Herald court held that a party seeking to
17 Id. at 934-35. The original suit involved physician misconduct. Id. at 935.
The newspaper did not seek access to discovery materials, which both the parties
and court stated were non-public parts of the trial process. Id: at 938 n. 1. How-
ever, settlement agreements are also arguably non-public aspects of a trial. For a
discussion of the special nature of settlement agreements, see infra notes 230-242
and supra notes 114-129 and accompanying text.
"58 Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 934. The fact the case never went to trial refutes
some courts' fears concerning abuse. For example, one court stated that everyone
would agree to settle after hearing damaging evidence and therefore closure
would become the "norm". Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571.
mg Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 934. The court rejected the Texas constitutional
claim, stating that the only case law pertained to criminal cases. Id. at 936. The
court similarly rejected the first amendment claim after noting that it also only
applied to criminal cases and that the Supreme Court had rejected a first amend-
ment right of access to records in the Nixon decision. Id.
1"0 Id.
-I Id.
162 Id. at 939. The court also stated that private agreements alone, however,
will not bind a court, a view similar to the Wilson and Minneapolis Star & Tribune
courts. Id. at 938; see also supra notes 84-98, 114-129, for a discussion of the two
cases.
- Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 938.
- Id. The court referred to FDICv. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982),
which supports the presumption of maintaining closure and distinguishes be-
tween unsealing and sealing. Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 938.
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unseal documents must show "extraordinary circum-
stances" in order to gain access to previously sealed
material. 165
Unlike some courts, however, Times Herald stated that
the value of encouraging settlement is a significant factor
which courts should consider in the balancing test in
many cases. 166 The court indicated that a state has a great
interest in encouraging settlements which weighs against
the public's need to have access to settlement terms. 167 In
the court's opinion, adopting a less stringent test would
affect future settlements. 16  Impeding settlements would
in turn increase the overload in trial courts because par-
ties could not depend on lasting confidentiality when ne-
gotiating settlements. 169 Additionally, by allowing easy
access to sealed material, a "chilling effect" on potential
litigants could occur with the effect of nonlitigation of
valid claims. 70 Finally, the Times Herald court noted that
many of the common balancing factors which support
public access do not apply to settlement agreements be-
cause of the private nature of the agreements. 17' Thus,
16' Id.
"' Id. at 938-40. The Times Herald court noted that the trial court's agreement
to seal the settlement was a significant factor in the parties' attaining settlement.
Id. at 940.
M7 Id. at 939.
168 Id.
-9 Id. The court stated:
In our litigous society, for us to take the position that private liti-
gants, who have settled their dispute before calling upon a court or
jury to find true the facts alleged in the pleadings, and who have
settled in reliance upon the court's agreement to seal the record
from public disclosure, have no right to expect the confidentiality to
which they agreed and to which they were assured, would seriously
impair the settlement process and would increase the trial overload
which presently exists in our judicial system.
Id.
Id, Id. Denying confidentiality would deter people from pursuing valid legal
claims because one reason people settle is to avoid publicity. Id. Moreover, the
public, as well as the state, has an interest in encouraging settlement because of
the increased time and costs of litigation compared to settling disputes. Id.
171 Id. at 940. The court-noted that most settlement agreements occur in pri-
vate with no court supervision and reflect the private desires of the particular par-
ties. Id. Therefore, the argument that openness serves to increase judicial quality
by public scrutiny does not apply to settlements. Id. at 939-40.
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the majority held that the newspaper did not meet its bur-
den of proof and denied access to the sealed
settlement. 172
Yet, the Times Herald decision was strikingly far from
unanimous. 173 The concurring opinion emphasized the
value of encouraging settlements and stated that neither
the press nor the public has a right to unlimited gathering
of information. 174 The dissenting opinion, focusing on the
Supreme Court cases establishing a first amendment right
of access to criminal trials and the two-prong Richmond
Newspapers test, however, believed a first amendment right
of access exists for civil trials and records.' 75 The dissent
stated that many of the factors pertaining to the value of
openness in criminal proceedings apply equally to civil tri-
als, especially when the nature of the suit itself concerns
the public directly or indirectly. 176  Finally, the dissent
stated that the more significant concerns are the parties'
rights to privacy rather than the value of encouraging set-
172 Id. The court stated that "the trial court's action in sealing the records was
within his [sic] discretionary authority, that there was a substantial basis for the
court's refusal to unseal the records, and no abuse of discretion is shown." Id.
175 Id. at 940. The court, sitting en banc on rehearing, tallied seven members in
the majority, one concurring opinion, and five in the dissent. Id.
174 Id. at 941 (Whitham,J., concurring). Judge Whitham stated that "[t]he right
to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather infor-
mation." Id. Further, Judge Whitham indicated that even if the first amendment
supports access, the value of encouraging settlement is so significant that the bal-
ance would still tip in favor of nondisclosure. Id.
175 Id. at 943-44 (Howell, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Nixon as a
case of special access because the public already had written transcripts of the
tapes and the press was seeking the actual tapes. Id. The dissent relied heavily on
Richmond Newspapers, stating that "a new day dawned" with the decision. Id. Judge
Howell interpreted the case as establishing constitutional protection for the acqui-
sition of newsworthy material. Id. at 943; see supra notes 20-31 for a discussion of
Richmond Newspapers and supra notes 108-110 for a discussion concerning the dis-
tinction between access to the trial and access to records, which indicates the dis-
sent's reliance may have been misplaced.
17,; Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 944 (referring to factors such as increasing the
quality of trials). Further, the dissent stated that the majority failed to critically
analyze potential differences and/or similarities between criminal and civil cases
before adopting the factors from criminal cases. Id. Judge Howell referred to
environmental, products liability, and discrimination cases, which potentially can
have a great impact on the public. Id. Thus, in these cases public interest in ac-
cess would weigh heavily in the balance. Id.
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tlements, and that even these rights might not tip the bal-
ance in favor of closure.' 7
Other cases further demonstrate the uncertainties over
access to sealed settlements. In Bank of America National
Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse Association,' 78 FAB III, a concrete
contractor, requested access to a sealed settlement agree-
ment between the Bank of America and Hotel Ritten-
house (HRA). 179 The Bank and HRA settled the dispute
before jury deliberations on the condition that the court
seal the agreement.18 0  FAB III, a creditor of HRA, al-
leged that the Bank and HRA had engaged in a conspiracy
to prevent public access to "otherwise public proceed-
ings."'18t The district court denied the motion to unseal
in a "one-paragraph order" stating that the private and
public interests in settling disputes outweighed the pub-
lic's interest in disclosure of the information.18 2
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted
177 Id. at 946-47. The dissent stated:
[T]he primary factor set forth in opposition of access is the parties'
agreement to seal the records. This should be given little weight.
The public has an independent interest in the record that the parties
may not foreclose by mere agreement. If the matter were left en-
tirely to the litigants and disclosure forbidden unless at least one
party consented to public access, the vast majority of civil records
would be screened from the public view. A drastic diminution of the
stock of information available to those who pay for the creation and
operation of the courts would inevitably result.
Id. at 946 (citations omitted). Further, the dissent pointed out that in the present
case the court sealed the entire record instead of the legitimately confidential por-
tions. Id. at 947. Thus, the closure exceeded the limit necessary to protect the
privacy interests of the parties. Id. at 934, 947. The dissent also disagreed with
the majority's valuation of encouraging settlement, ranking it as a very minor fac-
tor. Id. at 946.
178 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
179 Id. at 340-41. The Bank contracted with HRA to finance the construction of
the hotel, a relationship which ended in a suit for foreclosure. Id. at 340.
-o Id. The trial itself, however, was open to the public. Id. at 341. FAB III did
not want evidence from the trial, only the settlement, even though the settlement
itself was never "public information." Id.
i8, Id. FAB III did not assert a first amendment right of access, thus the court
did not address the issue. Id. at 343.
182 Id. For a discussion of the abuses of sealing records, see supra notes 46, 50,
95, and accompanying text. Other courts hold that the lower court must make a
specific record for review to prevent waste of time and abuses. See also supra notes
59 and 66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of a record.
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the common law balancing approach from Nixon and
placed the burden of proof on the party seeking closure to
overcome the presumption of openness. 18 3 According to
the majority, the issue before the court was "whether the
district court abused its discretion in holding that the ju-
dicial policy of promoting the settlement of litigation jus-
tifies the denial of public access to records and
proceedings to enforce such settlements."'' 84 The Bank
and HRA argued that settlement agreements are non-
public aspects of trials.' 8 5 The court, however, distin-
guished between a settlement which is not filed with a
court and one like the settlement between the Bank and
HRA.18 6 According to the court, when the Bank and HRA
filed their settlement with the court, the settlement tech-
nically became part of the judicial record. 8 7 Therefore,
Bank of America held that once parties file an agreement
with the court, the settlement takes on the same qualities
as evidence or court rulings with a corresponding public
"' Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 344. The court refused to apply the more stringent
first amendment test. Id. The court also emphasized the fact that the common
law right of access was not absolute. Id.
184 Id.
8 Id. at 343. The Bank and HRA relied on Seattle Times, a case concerning the
press' right of access to names and addresses of donors and members of a reli-
gious organization. Id. (referring to Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20
(1984)). In Seattle Times, the press wanted to publish information obtained during
discovery in a defamation suit between the newspaper and the organization. 467
U.S. at 23. The Supreme Court, in denying access to the information, discussed
and emphasized the distinction of discovery as a non-public part of a trial. Id. at
32-33.
186 Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 343-44. Moreover, the court stated that the parties
could have avoided disclosure by not filing the agreement with the court and mov-
ing for voluntary dismissal. Id. at 344. The parties filed the agreement with the
court anticipating future problems with compliance, thus hoping to avoid the
need to initiate a new suit. Id.
187 Id. at 343. The court stated:
Similarly, unlike the civil discovery materials at issue in Seattle Times,
a motion or a settlement agreementfiled with the court is a public com-
ponent of a civil trial. As in the cases involving trial rulings or evi-
dence admitted, the court's approval of a settlement or action on a
motion are matters which the public has a right to know about and
evaluate.
Id. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
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right of access.188
Yet, the Bank of America court, like the Times Herald
court, recognized the value of encouraging settlements to
both the public and the courts.1 89 After balancing the fac-
tors of the particular case, however,' 90 the Bank of America
court determined that the district court abused its discre-
tion in granting the motion to seal. 9 ' The court, there-
fore, allowed access to the agreement and declared that
such openness would promote an informed public; in-
crease the public's confidence in the system and public
understanding of the judicial process; act as a "check" on
the system by subjecting the court to public view, thus
promoting honesty and fairness within the courts; and
prevent abuses of closure. 192 Finally, the court noted that
the case was a single claim between two parties rather
than a multi-district, multi-party, complex case in which
188 Id. at 344.
189 Id. at 344, 346. The court stated that by adopting a policy of encouraging
settlements the public and courts could save time and costs, and mentioned that
settlement agreements generally may not be used as evidence to prove liability.
Id. (referring to FED. R. EVID. 408).
Mo Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 342-46. The factors included: the presumption of
openness of trials and records; court reliance on filed materials such as settlement
agreements requiring access for complete public understanding of the opinion;
the private nature of settlements contrasted with "public" evidence; the fact the
case was simple rather than complex; and the effects of access on future settle-
ments. Id.
19, Id. at 344, 346. In addition to the typical fears of abuse and secrecy related
to access of court records, the court focused on the fact the parties filed the settle-
ment with the court. Id. at 345. The majority stated:
In the name of encouraging settlements, [the dissent] would have us
countenance what are essentially secret judicial proceedings. We
cannot permit the expediency of the moment to overturn centuries
of tradition of open access to court documents and orders.
Having undertaken to utilize the judicial process to interpret the
settlement and to enforce it, the parties are no longer entitled to
invoke the confidentiality ordinarily accorded settlement agree-
ments. Once a settlement is filed in the district court, it becomes a
judicial record, and subject to the access accorded such records.
Id.
.92 Id. These benefits and factors are the same factors used in Richmond Newspa-
pers' historical/functional balance for a first amendment right of access, discussed
at supra notes 110-112. Bank of America, however, failed to distinguish between civil
and criminal trials, or even between access to records and access to trials.
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encouraging settlement becomes paramount. 93
By contrast, the Bank of America dissent, as did the Pal-
mieri and Times Herald courts, separated the original seal-
ing and later unsealing of settlements and advocated two
separate standards.'9 4 To judge Garth, the real issue was
"whether a privately negotiated settlement agreement,
agreed to and entered into a court record only on condition
that it remain secret, should now be unsealed because of the
district court's supposed abuse of discretion in permitting
it to be filed under seal." 95 The dissent advocated adopt-
ing a standard requiring a third party to prove extraordi-
nary circumstances or a compelling need in order to
unseal a record. 96 Further, the dissent stated that the ef-
fect of the majority's opinion was to create a per se rule in
which the public's right of access would always prevail
over the interest in settling the case and privacy.197
Therefore, Judge Garth asserted that the majority deci-
sion would "impair seriously the efficacy ofjudicial efforts
to encourage [the] settlement of many cases .... 98
In summary, therefore, there are two distinct situations
which may arise in some jurisdictions in "unsealing"
cases, varying with the parties' reliance. 99 If the parties
'i- Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 346. The dissent relied on FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, to
support its argument for the unsealing standard and necessity of encouraging set-
tlement. Id. at 348 (referring to FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1982)).
194 Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 346-47 (Garth, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 347. The dissent also noted that both parties requested the sealing, as
distinguished from cases in which only one party seeks closure. Id. at 346.
,9c Id. at 348 (referring to Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d at 232). The dissent noted
that the settlement was never public information to start with because it was en-
tered under seal. Id. at 347. This fact, according to the dissent, gave "rise to a
new and different factor: the reliance of the parties on the initial and continuing
secrecy of the settlement agreement." Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. Further, Judge Garth stated that the majority decision "utterly ignores
the importance of, and the practical realities surrounding, the process of settling
lawsuits." Id.
-' Id. at 348. As the dissent in Bank of America stated, "[a]lthough the common
law right of access must be given due regard, a court cannot operate in a vacuum.
To apply mechanistically the same test no matter what the factual circumstances,
is to risk doing injustice to parties before the court." Id.
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have not relied on the confidentiality of the settlement
agreement, the normal common law balancing test with
the presumption in favor of openness applies.200 If, how-
ever, the parties have relied on the confidentiality, the
burden of proof for the third party rises to a level requir-
ing a showing of extraordinary circumstances or compel-
ling need in order to unseal the settlement agreement.20 '
Recognizing such a two-level standard could alleviate the
fear that emphasis on the value of encouraging settle-
ments would result in secret trials.20 2 Courts avoid such
abuses because it is the court's weighing of all relevant fac-
tors which controls the outcome rather than the private
parties' agreement.20 3 Yet, in the already uncertain area
of access, adopting another standard based on a factor
such as reliance may create as many problems as it solves.
III. THE VALUE OF PROMOTING SETTLEMENT
Besides fairness and party reliance, which may support
maintaining closure, the value of encouraging settlement
may also support maintaining closure in some cases.
There are several reasons why courts should give the
value of encouraging settlements significant weight in the
balancing tests - both from the public's and the courts'
points of view.20 4 One reason is the litigation explosion of
recent years. This phenomenon has forced courts to in-
creasingly advocate alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion.20 5 To some courts and authorities, the increasing
2- See, e.g., Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d at 938. Normally, under the common law
balance test the presumption of openness tips the balance in favor of disclosure,
whereas here the balance shifts to favor maintaining closure if parties relied on
confidentiality. Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 348.
201 See, e.g., Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 348; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862.
202 See, e.g., Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865. In fact, the Bank of America dissent stated
that "branding such an action [sealing the record] as a 'secret judicial proceed-
ing,' with all that such a term may connote, and claiming that sealing practices will
'overturn centuries of tradition of open access' is not an adequate substitute for
reasoned judicial analysis." Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 349 n.3.
203 See, e.g., id. at 348-49 n.3 (Garth, J., dissenting).
2- Id. at 349.
205 Id. Judge Garth noted that "[b]etween 1973 and 1983, new filings of civil
cases in the federal district courts rose from 98,560 to 241,842, an increase of 145
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use of alternative dispute resolution is evidence of the
need to encourage settlements.2 °6 Additionally, an ex-
press goal of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is to encourage settlement. 0 7 Other factors which
support closure and the need to encourage settlement
are: the avoidance of wasting courts' and parties' re-
sources when settlement is successful; the fact that confi-
dentiality is a key factor in many settlements; and the fact
that settlement agreements may contain information
which the parties legitimately desire to keep from the
public but for which they cannot obtain a protective
order.2 0 8
In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation,0 9 cited by
several courts in their attempts to balance factors pertain-
ing to the right of access, 21 0 exemplifies the significant
value of settlement in certain cases. 21  Franklin was a com-
plex, multi-district case involving the insolvency of one of
percent." Id. (referring to Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 219, 227-29 (1985)).
206 Id.; see also PROVINE, SETrLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1986).
The increase has not only been in the number of suits, but also in the length and
complexity of suits. Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 349. According to one authority,
"[tihe federal courts held 213 trials lasting 20 days or more in 1973 [which]
doubled to 426 by 1983." Id. (referring to Levin & Colliers, supra note 205). The
judge stated that the majority of commentators and judges agree on "the value
and necessity of a vigorous policy of encouraging fair and reasonable settlement
of civil claims whenever possible," finding that "the literature ... focuses not on
whether settlement is desirable, but on how best to achieve it and how far ajudge
should go to encourage it." Id. at 350.
207 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Rule 16 states that one purpose of a pretrial confer-
ence is to "facilitat[e] the settlement of the case," and that the parties may discuss
at the conference "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial proce-
dures to resolve the dispute." Id. at 16(a)(5), (c)(7).
208 Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 350. Judge Garth pointed out in Bank ofAmerica that
one study often federal courts showed that 88 percent of cases settle pretrial, with
only nine percent actually reaching trial. Id. Thus, adoption of a policy which
discourages settlement would increase the already existing overload without any
new cases.
200 92 F.R.D. 468 (E.D.N.Y.), affdsub nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1982). This comment merely touches on the value of settlement as it may
relate to the balancing tests in access cases.
210 See Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 345, 348; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865; Times Herald,
717 S.W.2d at 938.
211 See supra notes 166-177, 191-193, and accompanying text for a discussion of
this issue.
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the nation's largest banks. 2  Two years after some of the
parties reached a settlement based on confidentiality,
third parties sought to unseal the agreement. 21 3 The dis-
trict court denied the motion, focusing on the parties' re-
liance on confidentiality in reaching the agreement and
the enormous costs involved.21 4 In fact, the court stated
that the only reason the parties ever settled was due to
their reliance on both protective orders and the sealing
orders. 2 5 According to the court, without the settlement,
the trial would have continued for at least six more
months.2 16 Continuing the trial would have forced an
even greater investment by the parties and the court and
consumed the balance of the insurance funds which pro-
tected both the defendants and their creditors.21 7
Moreover, in mass torts where problems are also com-
plex, the value of promoting settlements is also substan-
tial. As one authority, Judge Williams, noted, in a society
where parties file an ever increasing number of mass tort
lawsuits, "it is not an overly pessimistic prediction that,
absent some legislative or judicial solution, our attempt to
try these virtually identical lawsuits, one-by-one, will
bankrupt both the state and federal court systems. ' 21 8
22 Franklin, 92 F.R.D. at 472.
213 Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d at 231.
214 Franklin, 92 F.R.D. at 472. The court noted that the case lasted over five
years, contained volumes of discovery materials and documents, and cost the par-
ties millions of dollars in legal fees before the parties settled. Id. at 469. Further,
the court stated that "[h]ad the trial continued, many millions of dollars more
would have been expended in legal fees, a trial court would have been heavily
engaged for a long period, more appeals were inevitable and jurors would have
been inconvenienced." Id. at 470.
215 Id. at 472. The court stated:
The settlement agreement resulted in the payment of substantial
amounts of money and induced substantial changes of position by
many parties in reliance on the condition of secrecy. For the court
to induce such acts and then to decline to support the parties in their
reliance would work in injustice on these litigants and make future




218 See S. Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324
(1983). Williams further noted that several current mass tort suits "[threaten] to
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Williams separates mass tort cases into two categories.21 9
He classifies the first category as mass products liability
cases and the second as mass accident cases such as plane
crashes.220 Williams advocates using the class action de-
vice to alleviate some of the problems with certain mass
torts, such as products liability cases. 22' Nevertheless,
Williams also recognizes that mass accident cases are not
normally suitable for class actions and that many courts
persist in opposing the use of class actions in such
cases. 2 22 Finally, Williams notes that "the cost of retaining
experts, collecting medical or technical data and collect-
ing hundreds of depositions and affidavits preclude[s] the
vigorous maintenance of a complex product liability suit
by an individual plaintiff. '223 Therefore, due to the high
costs of suits and absence of alternatives such as class ac-
tions, settlement is possibly the most desirable and feasi-
ble alternative in mass accident cases.2 2 4  Any actions
hindering settlement, therefore, could be extremely
costly.225
last well into the next century." Id. He noted that according to the 1981 Annual
Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Court, over 9,000 new
products liability suits were filed in district courts, representing a 17 percent in-
crease over the 1980 figures and following a trend which began in 1974. Id. at 324
n.2.
219 Id. at 324 n.l.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 325.
222 Id. at 329.
223 Id. at 329 n.19.
224 See supra note 222 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence of
alternatives.
225 See Franklin, 92 F.R.D. at 472 and supra notes 209-217 and accompanying
text for a discussion of mass torts, options and costs. One court stated:
Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor.
Judges and lawyers alike strive assiduously to promote amicable ad-
justment of matters in dispute, as for the most wholesome of reasons
they certainly should. When the effort is successful, the parties
avoid the expense and delay incidental to litigation of the issues; the
court is spared the burdens of a trial and the preparation and pro-
ceedings that must forerun it.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 676 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Aultra v.
Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); see also Times Herald, 717 S.W.2d
at 941-42. The Times Herald concurring opinion indicated that even if the court
used the heightened scrutiny test from a first amendment basis for access that the
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Additionally, in mass tort lawsuits, encouraging settle-
ment takes on an even greater value since the defendant
cannot look solely at an isolated agreement but rather
must consider the potential of many suits by many par-
ties.226 This requires the defendant to anticipate the ef-
fect of a single settlement agreement on all the possible
suits. 227 Moreover, if settlement is the most desirable al-
ternative in these cases court supervision and approval of
settlements may protect the plaintiffs by "evening out the
odds" between defendant corporations and individual
plaintiffs.228 Yet, ironically, court involvement also de-
substantial value of encouraging settlement to a state alone could tip the balance
in favor of closure. Id. The concurring opinion further stated that the value of
settlement is a "compelling governmental interest" and a trial court's order seal-
ing an agreement is "no greater than [is] necessary or essential to the protection
of the State's interest in encouraging and facilitating the settlement of lawsuits
pending in its courts." Id. at 941.
226 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 392 N.W.2d at 205 (access to settlement in
plane crash case with pending suits).
227 Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 351 (Garth, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
because the defendant has to look to the effect of any agreement on many cases,
the defendant will be less likely to settle favorably with a party in the absence of
confidentiality. Id. The dissent stated:
Moreover, it is precisely in the context of mass torts with multiple
plaintiffs such matters as air disasters, toxic injuries, and products
liability claims - that the interest in settlement is particularly
strong. Such cases are characteristically long, complex, and costly to
try, and the savings in public and private resources achieved by set-
tling them are immense. As one judge familiar with the trial of mass
tort cases noted: 'Even saving one week of judicial time per case
would, as most trial judges know, be substantial. For example, in the
Dalkon shield litigation, the record disclosed that, if the usual per-
centage (90) of the 1000 member statewide class settled their case,
the savings of judicial resources in the trial of the remaining 100
would amount to 400 weeks, or, roughly, eight years of trial time. In
addition, there would be an estimated savings of $26 million in liti-
gation expense to the parties and $7 million of court expenses.'
Id. at 352 (quoting Williams, supra note 218, at 323, 328).
228 See supra note 225 for a discussion of why courts may need to supervise set-
tlements because of party inequality; see also The Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22,
1987, at 8A, col. 2. The article, Sealed Lawsuits Deal with Poisonings, Sex, Surgery,
stated that court supervision and approval of settlements is necessary in some
cases, as well as non-disclosure of the parties' names, if the parties are mentally
retarded or children who may fall victim to frauds. Id. The article cited one case
involving lead poisoning of mainly young children which resulted in a $20 million
sealed settlement. Id. The plaintiffs' attorney agreed to seal the records to pre-
vent exploitation of the children by "aluminum-siding people." Id.
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stroys any opportunity for confidentiality in some
jurisdictions. 29
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AMID THE UNCERTAINTY
Besides giving weight to the value of encouraging set-
tlement, there are solutions and other considerations
which could alleviate some of the confusion regarding ac-
cess to settlement agreements. One consideration in set-
tlement access cases, for example, should be the
distinctions between pretrial versus trial proceedings or
records, distinctions which are related to the "court reli-
ance" factor.23 ° In In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press,23' the court separated pretrial materials and trial
records, stating that pretrial information is not part of the
open court record upon which a court relies to form a
judgment on the merits.23 2 The court further stated that
229 See supra notes 64-68, 186-191, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the view that filing any material with a court makes the material part of the official
court record and therefore subject to access.
230 See, e.g., In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1335. This case concerns third party
attempts to obtain sealed discovery documents used to support a motion for sum-
maryjudgment in a civil defamation case. Id. Other authorities, however, have the
opinion that any material, even settlements, become public property once the par-
ties file a lawsuit regardless of whether a court relies on the material. See Dallas
Morning News, Nov. 22, 1987, at 24A, col. 6. The article quotes David Anderson,
professor of law at the University of Texas, as stating:
[The parties have] invoked the public processes, and we pay for the
court, we pay the judge's salary and we pay for that courtroom. It is
not then their option to decide that having availed [themselves] of
all these public resources [they can] now decide to make this a
purely private matter.
Id.
d2. In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1334. The court reviewed the history of access to
pretrial materials and the status of state and federal law regarding access to such
materials. Id. The court held that as a general rule there is not a common law
right of access to prejudgment records in civil cases. Id. Similarly, settlements are
prejudgment, nonpublic parts of a trial.
232 Id. Pretrial materials include pleadings and discovery materials - items not
yet entered as evidence, Id. The court held that, since a court does not rely on
pretrial materials for an ultimate judgment on the merits, public access will not
serve to enlighten the public as to the rationale behind a decision. Id. at 1335.
The court stated that:
The factor most obviously distinguishing the request for records in
the present case from the requests at issue in the vast majority of
reported cases - and the factor that obviously caused the District
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pretrial materials are private efforts, occurring without
court direction and with the content determined solely by
the private individuals. 233  Thus, public access to pretrial
material may not serve any of the functions usually cited
to support access.23 4 For example, access will not serve to
increase the quality of judicial proceedings by placing the
trial participants under public scrutiny.23 5 Further, In re
Reporters noted that the factors which plaintiffs cite in sup-
port of a right to access arose in criminal cases.23 6 In the
court's opinion, these factors do not apply equally to civil
proceedings.2 37
Thus, to the extent settlement agreements are compa-
rable to private, pretrial aspects of a trial upon which the
Court to deny access without the document-by-document examina-
tion that ordinarily accompanies Rule 26(c) protective orders - was
the pendency of the litigation at the time the request was made. We
must consider, therefore, whether the tradition of public access in-
cludes pre-judgment access . . . . '[A] record or transcript brought
into this court on appeal, after judgment entered on the proceedings by the
tribunal appealed from, do [sic] not stand upon the footing of original
papers placed in the files of a court of original jurisdiction, and where
there has been no trial had or judgment entered thereon.'
Id. at 1333 (quoting an earlier opinion, Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404
(1894)).
233 Id. at 1335. The court drew an analogy to the fact that a party may not base
a defamation suit on pretrial documents as pleadings because the material at this




236 Id. at 1336-37.
237 Id. The court stated:
Even assuming, as seems unlikely, that these functions are as important
in the context of civil suits between private parties as they are in
criminal prosecutions, they are not greatly enhanced by access to
documents (which, unlike live proceedings, do not contain unre-
cordable subtleties) before judgment rather than after.
Id. at 1337 (emphasis added). The In re Reporters dissent, however, focused more
on a court's reliance rather than on a private/public analysis of pretrial materials.
Id. at 1342-43 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that once a party files
any material with a court, regardless of the stage of litigation, on which the court
subsequently relies to make any judgment, the right of access attaches to the ma-
terial. Id.; see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Anti-
trust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that the right of access
attaches when the documents are submitted in connection with any motion to the
court).
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court does not rely to form a judgment, the value of a
right of access should decrease.2 38 Special problems
arise, however, when a court must approve a settlement
agreement.2 39 This is because the approval requires court
assessment, which in turn may support access based on
the court's reliance to form a judgment. 40 One commen-
tator noted this particular problem and advocated, as a
solution to access problems, adopting an access test based
on whether the material formed the basis of a decision on
the merits.2 4' In a case requiring.court approval of a class
action settlement, for example, one court dealt with the
problem by holding that because the court opinion ap-
proving the settlement served to give the public enough
indicia of the court's rationale, the court should deny ac-
cess to the actual settlement.24 2
2-8 See supra notes 230-250 and accompanying text for a discussion of the quali-
ties of pretrial materials and why access is not as vital. Further, settlement agree-
ments depend largely upon the desires of the parties and their counsels' skills.
For example, settlement may only reflect a desire to avoid publicity or the time
and costs of litigation, rather than any belief in guilt or innocence. See supra notes
117, 120-125, 171, and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinctions of
settlements; see also FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
219 See Marcus, supra note 13, at 49. Marcus discusses the right of access to
pretrial materials and settlements and the distinctions of pretrial materials. Id.
He stated that in pretrial situations, the court has not determined whether a "gen-
uine dispute" exists. Id. Therefore, disclosure of the information would "provide
little insight into the decision on the merits .... Moreover, a ruling that a party
must disclose to the public all materials offered in connection with a motion for
summary judgment that is ultimately denied could preclude later settlement con-
ditioned on confidentiality." Id.
240 Id. at 49 n.206. Marcus noted:
Particularly difficult problems may result from a court's duty under
rule 23(e) to approve any settlement of a class action. To do so, a
court must conclude that the settlement is 'fair, reasonable and ade-
quate', a process that requires some assessment of the evidence un-
earthed by the parties. If that material is covered by a protective
order, the court's process of assessment may provide a basis for va-
cating the order. Yet, disclosure might preclude a settlement con-
tingent on confidentiality.
Id. (citation omitted). Because Marcus feels that the critical issue justifying public
access is the interest of the public in overseeing the judicial process, the test
should focus on the court's reliance on the material occurring when the court
enters a judgment on the merits. Id. at 49.
241 Id.
242 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1981).
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Other commentators have also proposed solutions to
some of the problems generated by third party access to
sealed settlement agreements and other confidential
materials.24 3 First, some suggest that courts should rec-
ognize the value of confidentiality in encouraging settle-
ments and guarantee confidentiality in "good faith"
cases. 244 For example, courts could give greater weight to
the value of encouraging settlements in the balancing
tests.24 5 Alternatively, courts could determine if a court
relied on the information in forming a judgment on the
merits, thereby increasing the need for disclosure.246 Ad-
ditionally, courts could develop clearer guidelines de-
lineating the proper inquiry and standards for granting
sealing requests, which could not only make better
records, but prevent abuses as well.247
243 See supra notes 6, 59, 66, and accompanying text for a discussion of some
problems and suggestions for reform.
244 See Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States,
101 F.R.D. 161, 233 (1983) (Dean Edward A. Dauer speaking on the topic of
"How Lawyers and Judges Can Use Alternatives to Litigation").
2.5 See id. at 233. Dean Dauer stated:
There are legitimate, good faith reasons for the parties who are try-
ing to work out a solution to something like [a] toxic tort case to
want their discussion to be private, immune both from later admis-
sion and immune from discovery by other potential plaintiffs' law-
yers later down the road, maybe even from competitors, and I think
there are good faith reasons for wanting that privacy. That confi-
dentiality is a very large advantage that will, if it can be guaranteed,
make [alternate methods of dispute resolution] even more useful as
adjuncts to the judicial process than they already are.
Id.
246 Id. Further, Dauer stated that "in the current state of the law in most juris-
dictions, practically every place, we can't guarantee that degree of confidentiality
that the parties would ideally like to have." Id. He concluded with the statement:
We need a little evolution, I think, and maybe a little clarification of
what the applicable law of privilege or confidentiality might be.
Judges, I am told, don't make law, but they do adapt it to changing
circumstances, and I think the development of [alternative methods
of dispute resolution] is a changing circumstance.
Id.; see also supra notes 63-68, 230-242, and accompanying text for a discussion of
reliance as the test for disclosure.
247 See Note, supra note 46, at 1350-51. The author advocates clear guidelines in
order to prevent "some of the harm from ... hasty closures." See also supra notes
59 and 66, and accompanying text for a discussion of the related concern that
lower courts fail to make an adequate record for review. Thus, one simple reform
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Another authority suggests the adoption of the "clear
and convincing" standard to justify closure. This stan-
dard avoids the uncertainties and inconsistencies until the
Supreme Court rules on whether the first amendment
supports access to civil trials or records and clarifies the
standard which courts should use.24 8 In any case, courts
need , to ultimately resolve the questions concerning the
nature of settlement agreements. 49 If settlement agree-
ments are non-public aspects of the trial process, courts
must answer the question of whether voluntary filing, or
discussion of the agreement in court, truly alters this pri-
vate nature and justifies access. 50
IV. CONCLUSION
The scope of the public's right of access to sealed set-
tlement agreements is uncertain.25' Yet, by adopting
clearer guidelines and a uniform standard for all cases,
courts could alleviate some of the uncertainties. 252  Most
is for lower courts to specify the exact factors and weight of each on the record to
facilitate review.
246 See Hagenbach, supra note 110, at 882. Hagenbach advocates the use of the
clear and convincing standard instead of the more stringent first amendment test,
which requires a party to show "compelling governmental interests." Id.
249 See Marcus, supra note 13, at 29-41 (discussing the differences between pre-
trial materials and protective orders in view of the non-public nature of the infor-
mation). Marcus stated:
Many of the most troubling consequences of the public access ap-
proach result from the assumption that nonparties have some right
to obtain discovery material. This attitude is likely not only to foster
litigation over protective orders and preclude settlement, but also to
sanction lawsuits designed to obtain information rather than judicial
relief.
Id. at 29; see also supra notes 120-125, 230-242, and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the private nature of certain materials and records. Unless a suit actu-
ally -goes to trial and the parties discuss the settlement in court, settlement is
merely a private contract based on discovery materials.
250 See supra notes 68, 230-243, and accompanying text for the view that filing or
discussion makes the settlement part of the record and subject to access the same
as evidentiary materials.
251 See supra notes 13-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ-
ing views and tests, ranging from a first amendment basis to a common law basis
with two variations.
252 See supra notes 107, 232-250, and accompanying text for a discussion of pos-
sible reforms.
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importantly, courts should address critical issues in-
depth. These issues include the differences between ac-
cess to trials and access to court records, as well as the
differences between civil and criminal proceedings.253
Some courts, however, have not recognized these issues
in the past. 25 4 This situation in turn causes much of the
uncertainty in right of access cases. Unfortunately, the
problems cannot be completely eliminated until the
Supreme Court decides whether a first amendment right
of access applies to civil proceedings and records.255
Furthermore, some cases raise legitimate questions
about reliance of parties on confidentiality.25 6 This
should also be considered by the courts in an analysis of
whether to grant public access to sealed settlement agree-
ments.25 7 The difference between the original sealing of a
settlement and later unsealing is a valid concern. Yet, the
solution of adopting two different standards for closure
and access adds to the confusion by introducing subjec-
tive questions of the parties' reliance. 258 Reliance, in turn,
raises additional questions such as how much reliance is
necessary to justify continuing closure and how courts
should measure reliance.259
2" See supra notes 41, 117, 176, 238, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the failure to discuss distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings and
records. The civil/criminal distinction is significant because the factors which
courts cite to support first amendment access arose in criminal cases. Another
issue some courts neglect is a party's reliance on confidentiality in agreeing to
settle. Without the sealing order, the very materials that the third party seeks
would never have existed. See supra notes 142-203 and accompanying text for a
discussion of party reliance.
2 See supra notes 32-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where
courts failed to recognize or discuss issues such as the distinctions between access
to trials and access to records, or between civil and criminal actions.
255 See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court decision in this area and the distinctions between access to
records and access to trials.
256 See supra notes 142-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases dis-
cussing party reliance and later third party access. This is especially significant
when the court actively encouraged settlement and guaranteed confidentiality.
257 Id.
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Additionally, courts must address questions regarding
the unique nature of settlement agreements.260 Courts
recognize the private, non-public nature of pretrial dis-
covery materials. Nevertheless, they sometimes fail to ap-
ply such distinctions to settlements which also occur in
private and depend on many of the same factors. For ex-
ample, if a public right of access rests in part on the pub-
lic's need for access in order to understand the workings
of the judiciary, courts should analyze whether release of
settlements will really aid the public in its effort to under-
stand court actions.26' If courts do not rely on settlement
agreements to form a judgment on the merits, the need
for access should decrease because release will not facili-
tate public understanding of the judicial system.262
Also, the value of encouraging settlements is a factor
which affects the balancing process. 63 Courts should,
therefore, recognize the value of encouraging settlements
as a means to decrease court overloads and the costs of
lawsuits.264 Yet, recognizing the value of encouraging set-
tlements does not address the issue of how much weight
courts should give the factor in the balancing tests.26 5
Moreover, concerns such as whether allowing access to
sealed agreements will prevent some litigants from pursu-
ing valid claims in order to avoid publicity may have no
clear, quantitative answer to "balance" in the various
tests.2 66 Another issue with no apparent conclusive an-
2-See supra notes 117, 120-125, 185, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the private nature of settlements as opposed to evidentiary materials.
261 See supra notes 63-68, 187-237, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "public understanding" issue and court reliance on material necessitating
release.
262 Id. Moreover, if the court balances the value of encouraging settlement with
ail the relevant factors, the common law balancing process should adequately pro-
tect the parties and prevent abuses.
263 See supra notes 114-129, 204-229, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the need to encourage settlements, especially in mass tort cases.
264 Id.
265 Id. Other factors, such as party reliance, time, costs, and the number of po-
tential suits, come into play. Id.
26 See supra notes 120-125, 166-174, 204-250, and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the possible chilling effect when parties cannot rely on confidenitality.
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swer is whether a policy of permitting access will truly im-
pede settlements. 67 A possible effect could be to
encourage faster settlement in order to avoid trial en-
tirely. If the litigants could not rely on confidentiality of
the settlement terms to shield them once a trial began or
they filed the agreement with the court, they arguably
might settle faster.268
Finally, courts should recognize the issues raised when
they hold that voluntary filing of an agreement with the
court determines accessibility.2 69 A party may, for exam-
ple, anticipate compliance problems and wish to avoid fil-
ing a completely new suit in the future.270 Thus, the filing
serves judicial efficiency and brings the settlement under
the view of the court.2 71 Filing could also act to even-out
the odds when parties on opposite sides of a case are not
equal in terms of power or resources.272 Moreover, in
mass tort cases, such as airplane disasters, the value of en-
couraging a settlement takes on a new dimension and may
deserve more recognition and weight in the balancing
tests 273
No easy or single solution appears, ultimately, to an-
swer the issues raised by third party access to sealed set-
tlement agreements.2 74 A more critical analysis recognizing
such issues should be the goal of both the parties and the
Additionally, equitable concerns come into play if a court encouraged and actively
participated in a settlement, agreeing to closure, while a later court overrules and
permits access by third parties. Thus, not only party reliance but court participa-
tion may become a factor to weigh in the balance.
267 Id.
268 Id.
26, See supra notes 42, 186-188, 230-242, and accompanying text for a discussion
of cases holding that filing changes the nature of the material.
270 See, e.g., Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 344.
27 Id.; see also supra notes 223 and 228 for a discussion of the "inequality" issue.
272 Inequality between the parties may suggest that courts should approve set-
tlements, without the danger that approval will later enable third parties to gain
access based on a "court reliance" theory.
273 See supra notes 128 and 218-228 for a discussion of the value in mass torts.
Yet, factors such as whether the case is a mass tort and how many potential plain-
tiffs exist also add to the complexity of the analysis.
274 See supra notes 32-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which the courts failed to analyze issues in access cases.
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courts until the Supreme Court provides the conclusive
answer. In the interim, lower courts could alleviate part
of the problem and abuse by specifying the factors
weighed and the weight given to each factor.275 Until a
conclusive answer comes, however, litigants should be
aware of potential access and the false security of sealing
settlements.
'-"' See supra notes 59, 66, 182, and accompanying text for a discussion of this
view and courts holding that a specific record is necessary.
